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Death With Dignity: Proposed
Amendments To The California Natural
Death Act
Most laws passed by the state legislature affect our lives, but at
least one, the California Natural Death Act, affects our death. For
the most part today, gone is the ability to take that last breath
before death in a warm, quiet bed at home surrounded by loved
ones; that scene has been replaced by hospital rooms or long-term
care facilities in which tubes, wires and electronic equipment of
medical wizardry help prolong lives with icy indifference. In an
attempt to lend more humanity and dignity to the dying process,
this Comment advocates that the California Legislature amend
the Natural Death Act to clarify ambiguous language and to al-
low non-terminal, as well as terminal, patients to benefit from the
statute. In addition, this Comment proposes that the legislature
broaden the Act to permit physician aid-in-dying under certain
limited conditions and upon patient request.
Now ... we are on the threshold of new terrain - the penumbra
where death begins but life, in some form, continues. We have been
led to it by the medical miracles which now compel us to distinguish
between 'death,' as we have known it, and death in which the body
lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) does
not.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Death is inevitable. Although modern medical technology is able
to forestall death with "stunning virtuosity," it is not always able to
alleviate patients' suffering.2 Thus, "the quality of the additional life
so skillfully sought can range from marginally tolerable to positively
1. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1980).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT 15 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT SAN DIEGO, Panel Debate, Long Term Care: When Is Enough Enough? (Oct. 14,
1987), quote by Larry Schneiderman, M.D. [hereinafter UCSD Panel].
miserable." This conflict has led to fears that dying will become a
prolonged, undignified and agonizing process for thousands of pa-
tients.4 As a result, the right to "pull the plug" - withdraw artifi-
cial life-support equipment 5 or withhold life-sustaining proce-
dures-has been litigated in courts throughout the country.7
Legislative provisions such as the California Natural Death Act
(the Act)3 attempt to establish a statutory right for terminally ill
patients to refuse treatment by use of a living will.' The California
Natural Death Act, the first such statute in the country, has been
3. Ruark, Raffin and Stanford Univ. Medical Center Comm'n on Ethics, Initial-
ing and Withdrawing Life Support, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 25, 25 (1988).
4. A 1983 presidential commission estimated that at any one time, there are
approximately 5,000 permanently unconscious patients in the United States. Life-support
treatment is withdrawn from many of those patients. PRESIDENT'S CoM'N, supra note 2,
at 176-77 n.15.
Since Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross's pioneering work on dying in a society with modern
medicine (see E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH & DYING (1969)), other commentators have
reexamined traditional American attitudes toward life and death. See, e.g., D. HUMPHRY
& A. WICKETr, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1986); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIO-
LOGICAL REVOLUTION (1976); J. ROBERTSON, THE RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL
(1983); A. DOUDERA & J. PETERS, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF TREATING CRITI-
CALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS (1982).
As examples of the public's awareness of this issue, the author notes the following.
After a "Dear Abby" column on living wills ran in the nation's newspapers in 1983, the
Society for the Right to Die received over 110,000 requests for copies of the document.
Leflar, Liberty and Death: Advance Health Care Directives and the Law of Arkansas, 39
ARK. L. REV. 375, 408 (1986). In addition, a 1986 Roper Poll of 1,998 Americans found
that 62% believed doctors should be legally permitted to end a patient's life if there is no
hope of recovery and the patient requests it. R. RISLEY, A HUMANE AND DIGNIFIED
DEATH: A NEW LAW PERMITTING PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING 36 (1987) [hereinafter INI-
TIATIVE HANDBOOK]. FURTHER, THE RIGHT TO DIE ISSUE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF TWO
RECENT MOVIES: "WHOSE LIFE IS IT ANYWAY?" WITH RICHARD DREYFUS (1981), AND
THE TELEVISION MOVIE, "RIGHT TO DIE" WITH RAQUEL WELCH, WHICH AIRED ON OCT.
12, 1987, AND WAS BASED ON A TRUE STORY OF AN AMYOTROPHIC LATERAL SCLEROSIS
(Lou GEHRIG'S DISEASE) VICTIM.
5. Artificial life-support equipment can include respirators, dialysis, and intrave-
nous feeding. See Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Phy-
sicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 932 (1979) [hereinafter Stanford Study].
6. Life-sustaining treatment has been defined in various ways. The California
Natural Death Act defines it as any medical procedure which uses mechanical means to
sustain or supplant a vital function, but does not include medication or any medical pro-
cedure to alleviate pain. Thus, life-sustaining equipment could include respirators, dialy-
sis and intravenous feeding. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp.
1987). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 3.
7. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484 (1983).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
Natural Death Act].
9. In a living will, a concept proposed by Luis Kutner in 1950, patients still in
control of their faculties indicate in a written document the extent to which they would
or would not consent to treatment. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasian: The Living
Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2,
at 139-41. A living will is also known as a written directive.
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criticized as being constitutionally defective, 10 problematic,11 and
cumbersome; 12 yet, it has not been amended since its passage twelve
years ago. However, a bill amending the Natural Death Act was
introduced in the state legislature.' 3 Also, both a proposed State Bar
Conference of Delegates Resolution14 and a similar but more expan-
sive initiative, 15 which was targeted for the 1988 November ballot,
amend the Natural Death Act to permit a physician to administer
aid-in-dying under certain limited conditions to patients who request
it.' 6
This Comment will discuss, first, the development of the right to
die based on a constitutional right to privacy and the common law
informed consent doctrine. Second, this Comment will compare the
California Natural Death Act to other such statutes which have
been enacted by state legislatures nationwide. A comparison will
show that, although California led the way in enacting a right to die
statute, other states have since enacted legislation which is broader,
less confusing, and less ambiguous, thus allowing greater numbers of
patients to die with dignity. Third, this Comment will address how
California appellate courts have expanded the provisions of the Nat-
ural Death Act. Finally, this Comment will analyze the proposed
Resolution and Initiative.
10. See Comment, Give Me Liberty & Give Me Death: The Right to the Califor-
nia Natural Death Act, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 988-90 (1980). The author sug-
gests the Natural Death Act is underinclusive and that the large amount of discretion
given to the physician concerning when to withhold or withdraw life support restricts the
patient's exercise of the right to die.
11. See Comment, A Proposed Amendment to the California Natural Death Act
to Assure the Statutory Right to Control Life Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 17
U.S.F. L. REV. 579, 600-05 (1983). The author indicates five patient situations which the
Natural Death Act would not cover. For example, a directive executed prior to 14 days
after diagnosis of a terminal illness is not covered under the Act, nor is a directive which
does not exactly follow the statutory form. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
12. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr.
484, 489 (1983). (The Natural Death Act's procedural requirements are "so cumber-
some that it is unlikely that any but a small number of highly educated and motivated
patients will be able to effectuate their desires.")
13. S. 1808, authored by Sen. Barry Keene (D-Vallejo). The bill passed the state
legislature on August 25, 1988, but was vetoed by Gov. Deukmejian on September 28,
1988. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
14. Res. 3-4-87, sponsored by the California State Bar's Conference of Delegates
on Sept. 20, 1987, and called the Dignified Death Act (on file with the San Diego Law
Review) [herinafter Resolution].
15. The Humane & Dignified Death Act Initiative, proposed by Americans
Against Human Suffering, Inc. [hereinafter Initiative] (on file with the San Diego Law
Review).
16. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
This Comment will conclude that the California Natural Death
Act should be amended to clarify ambiguous provisions in the stat-
ute and to broaden the category of terminal as well as non-terminal
patients who could benefit from the statute. Additionally, the Act
should be expanded to permit physician aid-in-dying under certain
limited conditions and upon patient request. Procedures should be
instituted that will safeguard the right of patients to decide whether
to "struggle for yet another morning or slip gently into the night.
'17
II. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
The legally recognized right to die, which stems from the basic
principle of self-determination over one's body,18 is derived from two
sources - judicial interpretation of the United States Constitution
and the common law informed consent doctrine.1 Although the
Constitution does not explicitly enunciate a right to privacy, 20 the
United States Supreme Court found such a right in Griswold v. Con-
necticut,2' in the "penumbra" of rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights which create "zones of privacy. "22 The Court did not define
the scope of this constitutional right to privacy, but left its bounda-
ries to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 23 The Court extended
the right to privacy in Roe v. Wade24 by holding that personal pri-
vacy includes a woman's decision to have an abortion.25 While the
Court has yet to determine whether an individual has a constitu-
17. Riga, Privacy and the Right to Die, 26 CATH. LAW. 89, 126 (1981).
18. John Stuart Mill recognized this right in 1873: "Each is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers
by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to
live as seems good to the rest." J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in PREFACES TO LIBERTY - SE-
LECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 254 (B. Wishy ed. 1959).
19. The informed consent doctrine - whereby the patient must authorize treat-
ment after being informed about his or her condition, the nature of the treatment, the
substantial risks involved and alternative therapies - is based on a person's right of
bodily integrity. The doctrine was first enunciated by Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosps., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) ("Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body."). Accord, Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972).
20. The right to privacy received early judicial recognition in the dissenting opin-
ion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which Justice Brandeis re-
ferred to a "right to be let alone." Id. at 478. Brandeis referred to this right as the "most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id.
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right of a married couple to use contraceptives
without state interference).
22. Id. at 484 (Douglas, J.)
23. Id. at 497.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. The court warned, though, that the right to privacy was not absolute and
could be outweighed by compelling state interests, such as viability of the fetus and ma-
ternal health. Id. at 114. See also infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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tional right to die, a number of state courts have found such a right
to exist based on the informed consent doctrine and the right to
privacy.26
III. THE RIGHT TO DIE FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
A. In re Quinlan
Most of the first cases dealing with a refusal to consent to life-
sustaining treatment involved blood transfusions. In these cases, usu-
ally brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, the common law doctrine of
informed consent and the First Amendment's fundamental right of
religious freedom are interrelated. In In re President and Directors
of Georgetown College,2 a Jehovah's Witness refused a blood trans-
fusion for a bleeding ulcer. Since receiving blood is against the reli-
gious beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses, the patient refused to consent
to a blood transfusion which was needed to save her life. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the transfusion, not-
withstanding the patient's fundamental right to exercise her religious
beliefs, because of the state's compelling interest in preserving the
life of a patient whose death was imminent, and also because the
woman had a seven-month old child who might potentially have be-
come a ward of the state upon the patient's death. 8
In the In re Quinlan case,29 which was the first and the most pub-
26. See, e.g., Severns, 421 A.2d 1334; Satz, 379 So. 2d 359; Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. See infra notes 29-55
and accompanying text. Satz was the only case where the patient was competent to as-
sert his rights. In the others, the patient was unable to consent or refuse treatment and a
guardian asserted the patient's right to privacy.
27. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
28. Courts have consistently found such compelling state purposes. However, ex-
ceptions to this trend include In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Civ. 1972), and In re
Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). In Osborne, the court denied a
request for the appointment of a guardian to consent to the administration of blood
transfusions to a male Jehovah's Witness. Although the patient was the father of two
minor children, the court reasoned that because of the close family relationship which
existed, the children would be well cared for. Osborne, 294 A.2d at 374. In Brooks, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the state could not force a Jehovah's Witness, who was
mentally competent, without minor children, and who had released the hospital from
liability, to submit to a blood transfusion. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d at 372, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
The court based its decision on the constitutional right to be let alone, a form of the right
to privacy. Id. at 373, 205 N.E.2d at 442.
29. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). For in-depth reading about the Quinlan
case, see B. COLEN, KAREN ANN QUINLAN: DYING IN THE AGE OF ETERNAL LIFE
(1976).
licized a° decision directly to address the legal issues concerning the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a ter-
minal patient, the New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished the
blood transfusion cases from the situation of Karen Quinlan. In the
blood transfusion cases, the prognoses for the patients' recoveries
were good, thus the state's interest in preserving life superseded the
patients' right to privacy. 31 In contrast, the bodily invasion from arti-
ficial life support was great and the prognosis extremely poor for
Quinlan. 2 Therefore, Quinlan's right of privacy outweighed the
state's interest in preserving life.33
On April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, twenty-one, suffered irre-
versible brain damage resulting from two fifteen-minute periods dur-
ing which she stopped breathing after taking drugs and alcohol. In
the hospital, her breathing was regulated by a respirator and she was
fed through a nasogastric tube. Five months after Karen became un-
conscious, her father, Joseph Quinlan, petitioned the New Jersey Su-
perior Court, Chancery Division, to be appointed Karen's guardian
and to have her removed from the respirator.3 The superior court
refused the request. The Quinlans appealed to the New Jersey Su-
preme Court and in March 1976, the state high court reversed and
held that a respirator could be withdrawn from a patient in an irre-
versibly comatose condition, 5 without criminal or civil liability for
any participant. 3
30. The extent of publicity is illustrated by the extensive newspaper coverage in
the N.Y. Times. Articles on Quinlan ran on 55 days between Sept. 14, 1975 and Dec. 22,
1975. See 1975 N.Y. TIMES INDEx 2041. In 1976, Quinlan's case made the news on 52
days. See 1976 N.Y. TIMES INDEX 1406.
31. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
32. Id., 355 A.2d at 664.
33. Id., 355 A.2d at 664.
34. See Marsh, Living Will Legislation in Colorado: An Analysis of the Colo-
rado Medical Treatment Decision Act in Relation to Similar Developments in Other
Jurisdictions, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 5, 7-8 (1987) (quoting from J. QUINLAN, J. QUINLAN &
P. BATTELLE, KAREN ANN, THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR STORY 142 (1977)).
35. Several medical terms are used to describe the various levels of brain injury:
A patient in a persistent vegetative state is awake but unaware and may have sponta-
neous but involuntary movement. Most patients are respiratory dependent only tempora-
rily and the brain is able to maintain subsistence functions such as digestion, kidney
elimination and blood circulation, but no thinking functions. The brain damage is irre-
versible. These patients are also known by the term "permanently unconscious."
The term coma or comatose is often used to reflect different levels of unconsciousness.
A patient who exhibits no movements or breathing and whose eyes are closed is usually
considered brain dead. Brain death is the irreversible loss of all functions of the brain.
Medical treatment includes total respiratory support. Brain death in most states is a
proper means of diagnosing death. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 174-76; A.
DOUDERA & J. PETERS, supra note 4, at 63-66; D. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICA-
TIONS OF DEATH AND DYING 27-28 (1981).
Under California law, brain death is defined as "irreversible cessation of all functions
of the entire brain, including the brain stem .... " CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
7180(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984).
36. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
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The state supreme court stated that the constitutional right to pri-
vacy also encompassed a patient's decision to decline medical treat-
ment under certain circumstances.3" The court held that the individ-
ual's right to privacy outweighed the state's interest in the
preservation of life;38 the state interest in protecting life diminishes
as the magnitude of the bodily invasion from artificial life-support
systems increases and the prognosis becomes worse. Finding Quin-
lan's prognosis "extremely poor" since she would never resume cog-
nitive life, and the bodily invasion great since she required 24-hour
intensive nursing care, a respirator, a catheter and a feeding tube,
the court held that her right of privacy outweighed the state's inter-
est in preserving life. 9
The court found Karen's right to privacy would allow her to refuse
respirator treatment if she were competent to do so. No evidence of
sufficient probative weight was admitted to inform the court as to
what Karen's actual wishes would be concerning further treatment.
The court concluded that such a right could not be disregarded be-
cause she was unable to decide for herself. Therefore, the court de-
cided the only way to protect Karen's right of privacy would be to
allow that right to be asserted in her behalf by her family as surro-
gate decisionmakers.4 ° The court then established a new standard
which provided, with the concurrence of Karen's family, that life
support could be withdrawn if the attending physicians and a hospi-
tal ethics committee agreed there was no reasonable chance of
Karen returning to a cognitive, sapient state.41
B. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted a similar ap-
proach in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
37. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. The court recognized that the right to privacy
discussed in Griswold and Roe was broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment in much the same way it was broad enough to encompass a
woman's right to terminate pregnancy.
38. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. "We have no hesitancy in deciding ... that no
external compelling interest of the state could compel Karen to endure the unendurable,
only to vegetate a few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any
semblance of cognitive or sapient life." Id., 355 A.2d at 663.
39. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
40. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. This is considered the substituted
judgment rule. See infra note 87.
41. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Quinlan was successfully weaned from the
respirator but remained in a persistent vegetative state for another 10 years. She died on
June 11, 1985. See Marsh, supra note 34, at 8.
Saikewicz.'2 Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven-year-old severely re-
tarded man who had been institutionalized for most of his life, suf-
fered from acute myeloblastic leukemia. Chemotherapy treatment
would have caused a thirty to fifty percent chance of remission for
between two to thirteen months, but would have also caused drug-
related side effects, the reasons for which would have been beyond
Saikewicz's understanding. The attending physicians and guardian
ad litem recommended that chemotherapy be withheld, and a pro-
bate judge agreed.43 Two months later, on September 14, 1976,
Saikewicz died from pneumonia, a complication of the leukemia.
Thereafter, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its
opinion on November 28, 1977.4
The court held that all persons, whether competent or incompe-
tent, have a right to refuse medical treatment because "the value of
human dignity extends to both. 145 The court's reasoning was based
on balancing the patient's interest in bodily integrity and privacy
with four state interests: preservation of life, protection of innocent
third parties (especially patients' minor children), prevention of sui-
cide, and preservation of the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion.46 The only state interest the court found applicable was that of
preserving life, but it deemed such an interest of little weight given
the hopelessness of Saikewicz's prognosis.
47
The court also held that the state's suicide interest is the preven-
tion of irrational self-destruction. A decision to refuse treatment
when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure, as
in this case, did not constitute suicide because the patient did not set
into motion the natural processes that ultimately cause death.48
The Saikewicz court further held that the courts are the appropri-
ate forums to decide questions concerning discontinuing treatment,
unlike the New Jersey court in Quinlan, which adopted the approach
of entrusting the decision to the patient's guardian, family members,
attending doctors and a hospital ethics committee.49 However, the
court's opinion did not address what type of patients were to be in-
42. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
43. See D. MEYEas, supra note 35, at 359-60.
44. No explanation was given for the delay. Id. at 360 n.36.
45. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 745, 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 427, 432.
46. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
47. The interest of the State in prolonging a life must be reconciled with the
interest of an individual to reject the traumatic cost of that prolongation. There
is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved
where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the state interest where, as here,
the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individ-
ual life may be briefly extended.
Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
48. Id. at 743 n.l, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.ll.
49. Id. at 747, 370 N.E.2d at 434-35.
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cluded in judicial review.50
IV. THE RIGHT TO DIE FOR COMPETENT PATIENTS:
Satz v. Perlmutter
One of the first cases in which a court applied the Quinlani
Saikewicz balancing analysis to a competent patient's request to die
was in Satz v. Perlmutter.51 Abe Perlmutter, seventy-three, was suf-
fering from Lou Gehrig's disease. He was incapable of movement,
unable to breathe without a respirator and unable to speak without
extreme effort. He decided he no longer wanted to be connected to a
respirator and filed suit requesting permission to refuse further medi-
cal treatment. 52 The trial court and the Florida District Court of
Appeal granted Perlmutter's request. 53 The decision was affirmed by
the Florida Supreme Court in 1980, after Perlmutter had already
been removed from the respirator and had died a year before.54 The
state supreme court analyzed the four state interests mentioned in
Saikewicz, found none of them compelling, and held that, based
upon his constitutional right to privacy, Perlmutter had the right to
discontinue use of the respirator.55
Quinlan, Saikewicz, and Perlmutter demonstrate the evolution of
50. For example, did death have to be imminent or did the Saikewicz holding
require court review in all cases involving the proposed withdrawal of life support treat-
ment from incompetent patients, no matter how futile such treatment might be? Many
commentators felt that such an interpretation of the decision led to an unwarranted in-
trusion by the law into the last stages of a dying patient's life, making cases lengthy and
expensive and needlessly prolonging the suffering of the patient's family. See D. MEYERS,
supra note 35, at 363-64, and Riga, supra note 17, at 105.
These questions were later answered by the Massachusetts appellate courts in In re
Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (Court approval for incompe-
tent patient is needed only when treatment is considered lifesaving or life prolonging),
and Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986)
(Court permitted the guardian of a persistently vegetative patient to direct the cessation
of life-support measures without addressing the need for judicial approval).
51. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
52. 362 So. 2d at 161.
53. It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so
that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no
possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to do so
at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting never
ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially sus-
pended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades the patient's consti-
tutional right of privacy, removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to
self-determination.
Id. at 164.
54. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
55. Id. at 162. See also text accompanying note 46.
judicial interpretation of right to die issues in various jurisdictions. 6
Courts generally have upheld terminal or non-terminal competent
and incompetent patients' constitutional right to refuse medical care.
Moreover, courts have held that there need not be judicial review of
right to die cases for incompetent patients in the absence of legisla-
tion unless there is a dispute among a patient's family, guardian or
physicians. This view, however, has been debated by those who be-
lieve an incompetent patient's right to die should not be invoked by a
surrogate.5 7 Case law evolution has been accompanied in the major-
ity of states by legislative assistance through right to die statutes.
V. THE CALIFORNIA NATURAL DEATH ACT
In 1976, several months after the New Jersey Supreme Court's
Quinlan decision,58 California became the first state to legislate a
right to die.59 The Natural Death Act's legislative findings state that
56. See also In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987); Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
Eichner v. Dillon 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); and In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth,
452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
57. See, e.g., Pescetta, A Matter of Life and Death: Who Should Have the Power
to Choose on the Right to Die?, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 8, 1988, §1 (Open Forum), at 4, col
1.
The critical substantive flaw in the Quinlan decision and its progeny is the
assumption that the right of competent choice, which is necessary to a personal
decision to embrace death, can actually be exercised by someone else on an
incompetent's behalf. We may be willing to indulge the fiction that a surro-
gate's choice is the incompetent's when the choice to be made is whether the
incompetent should undergo some minor surgical procedure or should be cared
for in one hospital or another. But when the choice is whether the incompe-
tent's life should be extinguished, the pretense that the surrogate can act on the
incompetent's behalf is too dangerous to accept. Is it not wholly presumptuous
of anyone - whether relative or friend, doctor or court - to draw the line at
which another person would decide to accept death rather than continue
living? ...
To say that an individual's life can be taken on the basis of a deduction from
his "world view" that he "would have wanted" to be dead is a burlesque of due
process.
Id.
Pescetta also argues that relatives may have "powerful" reasons to favor death: the
ruinous cost of medical care and the emotional distress caused by the incompetent's ill-
ness. Physicians also may favor death because long-term care of comatose patients is of
little medical interest and absorbs scarce time, money and other resources. Id.
58. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). See supra notes
29-41 and accompanying text. Quinlan was decided in March 1976; the California As-
sembly passed the Natural Death Act in June 1976. For a discussion of the connection,
see, Right to Die Bill Passed by Assembly, San Francisco Chron., June 6, 1976, at 1.
59. Natural Death Act, §§ 7185-95, was sponsored by Assemblyman Barry
Keene, now a member of the Senate (D-Vallejo). Support for the bill at that time in-
cluded the California Medical Ass'n, the California Nurses Ass'n, the Comm'n on Ag-
ing, and the Nat'l Council of Senior Citizens. See A. 3060, ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RE-
SEARCH, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE STATE ASSEMBLY ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY 3D READING,
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artificial prolongation of life by modern medical technology may
cause "loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and suffering." 0
The Natural Death Act therefore provides that a qualified adult pa-
tient can direct his or her physician to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining medical care in the event of a terminal condition by use of
a written directive, or living will.6 The Natural Death Act includes
definitions of the terms "life-sustaining procedure," "qualified pa-
tient" and "terminal condition." 2 No physician, health facility or
licensed health professional acting under the direction of a physician
who participates in the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining
procedures under the Act is subject to civil or criminal liability.63
In order for the directive to take effect, a patient must be qualified
- diagnosed and certified in writing by two physicians, one of which
must be the attending physician, as suffering from a terminal condi-
tion. 4 Also, the directive must be initiated at least fourteen days
after diagnosis of a terminal condition.65 The directive is considered
non-binding on a physician if it is initiated prior to fourteen days
following diagnosis, but may be used by the physician as evidence of
the patient's wishes regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures.6 6 A physician is liable for unprofessional con-
duct for failure to follow a binding directive if the physician does not
transfer the patient to another doctor who will follow the patient's
wishes.6 7
at 2, Comments (1976).
60. Natural Death Act, § 7186. For further background information, see Assem-
bly Comm. on Health, Interim Hearing on Rights of Terminally III, Oct. 8, 1974.
61. Natural Death Act, § 7187; see generally Kutner, supra note 9.
62. "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or intervention
which utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital
function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to artificially pro-
long the moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death
is imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure"
shall not include the administration of medication or the performance of any medical
procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain. Id. § 7187(c).
"Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted
with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of whom shall be the attending physi-
cian, who have personally examined the patient. Id. § 7187(e).
"Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or ill-
ness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within rea-
sonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient. Id. § 7187().
63. Id. § 7190.
64. Id. § 7187(e).
65. Id. § 7191(b).
66. Id. § 7191(c).
67. Id. § 7191(b). According to the Natural Death Act's sponsor, Barry Keene,
The directive must be signed by two witnesses not related to the
patient by blood or marriage, who would not be entitled to the pa-
tient's estate, and who are not the attending physicians.6 The pa-
tient may revoke the directive at any time either in writing, verbally
to the attending physician, or by destroying the directive. 9 The di-
rective is effective for five years, after which time it must be re-exe-
cuted to remain effective. 70 If a directive was executed before the
patient was deemed terminal, the directive must be re-executed at
least fourteen days after the patient becomes qualified in order to
take effect.7 ' The directive must be in the form stipulated by the
statute.
72
more severe sanctions were politically unacceptable. See Stanford Study, supra note 5,
at 923 n.56.
68. Natural Death Act, § 7188.
69. Id. § 7189.
70. Id. § 7189.5.
71. Id. § 7191(c).
72. Id. § 7188. The directive in the Natural Death Act states:
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this day of - (month, year).
I , being of sound mind, willfully, and volunta-
rily make known my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under
the circumstances set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certified
to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of life-
sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of my
death and where my physician determines that my death is imminent whether
or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such procedures be
withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such life-
sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by
my family and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal right to refuse
medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my
pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a terminal
condition by M.D., whose address is
and whose telephone number is
I understand that if I have not filled in the physician's
name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have a terminal condi-
tion when I made out this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in
above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and men-
tally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of Residence
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The Natural Death Act does not apply to patients in a skilled
nursing facility,73 to pregnant women, or to terminally ill children.
7 4
The Natural Death Act also states that withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient does not constitute
a suicide,75 does not invalidate a life insurance policy for an insured
qualified patient, 6 and cannot be construed to condone mercy killing
or to permit any deliberate act to end life other than by the natural
process of dying.
77
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA NATURAL
DEATH ACT
Despite the Natural Death Act's passage as a response to the need
for such a statute, commentators have criticized the Act as too re-
strictive and ambiguous.78 The Natural Death Act's original author,
Senator Barry Keene, proposed Senate Bill 1808, which advocated
several major changes to the 1976 Natural Death Act. 9
73. Unless one of the two witnesses to the directive is a state-designated patient
advocate or ombudsman. Id. § 7188.5. The intent is to "recognize that some patients in
skilled nursing facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary decisionmaking role, by
virtue of the custodial nature of their care, as to require special assurance that they are
capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a directive." Id.
74. Id. § 7188.
75. Id. § 7192(a). Section 401 of the California Penal Code makes assisting an-
other to commit suicide a criminal offense. "Every person who deliberately aids, or ad-
vises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 401 (West 1970).
76. Natural Death Act, § 7192(b).
77. Id. § 7195.
78. See Meyers, The California Natural Death Act: A Critical Appraisal, CAL.
ST. B.J. 326 (1977); Comment, supra note 11, at 597-98; Stanford Study, supra note 5,
at 940-45.
79. The proposed changes made by S.1808, as revised on March 7, 1988, in-
cluded: (1) adding permanently unconscious to the definition of qualified patient, (2)
eliminating the 14-day waiting period after a terminal diagnosis before execution of a
directive, (3) adding misdemeanor penalties for those physicians who disregard a pa-
tient's directive and (4) deleting the requirement that death be "imminent" before life
support may be withheld or withdrawn, instead providing that without life-sustaining
treatment, a terminal condition will result in death within one year. Other amendments,
made on June 27, 1988, included: (1) allowing any two witnesses to sign the directive,
even if related to the patient, (2) permitting the directive to be valid until revoked, and
(3) not requiring the directive to be followed exactly in form.
S.1808 had the support of the California Council of Churches, the California Medical
Ass'n, the American Ass'n of Retired Persons, the California Catholic Conference, the
State Bar, and the California Senior Legislature. Planned Parenthood and the American
Civil Liberties Union specifically oppose the Natural Death Act's pregnancy provision,
which denies pregnant patients the right to die if it is probable the fetus could develop to
the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment. See supra
notes 101-105 and accompanying text. Interview with Paul Donahue, Aide to Senator
To date, thirty-nine state legislatures have enacted living will stat-
utes80 which vary widely in the breadth of their applications. The
Keene (Aug. 9, 1988).
In his veto message, Deukmejian said, "I am concerned that this bill compromises the
checks and balances in existing law relative to the withdrawal of life-sustaining services."
Deukmejian Vetoes Bill to Extend State 'Right to Die' Law, The Los Angeles Daily J.,
Sept. 29, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Deukmejian objected to the elimination of the Act's provision
which provides that directives are effective for five years because the measure would have
made "it impossible for the declaration to be revoked if the declarant is unable to com-
municate his or her desire to revoke." Id. The governor also criticized the elimination of
the "imminent" requirement because it would have granted "wide descretion to termi-
nate life on as estimate of death within one year, rather than an estimate of imminent
death." Id. But Donahue said Deukmejian ignored the broad support for the bill & in-
stead buckled under pressure from fundamentalists such as the Committee on Moral
Concerns and the California Pro-Life Council. In response to the governor's concerns,
Donahue argues that the proposed bill would have made revocation easier by permitting
it in any form instead of just in writing. Donahue also notes that the proposed bill pro-
vides that declarations are executed only when life-sustaining treatment prolongs the dy-
ing process, not immediately upon diagnosis of a terminal condition. Id.
Keene first proposed new legislation eight years ago to supplant the Natural Death
Act. The proposed statute, S.700, entitled the "Self-Determination in Medicine Act,"
was introduced but not acted upon in the 1979-80 legislative session. Some of the pro-
posed changes included allowing a terminally ill minor to refuse medical care if approved
by a court, allowing the execution of a binding directive before a patient becomes termi-
nally ill, allowing refusal of medical care by oral or written communication, and not
requiring the directive to follow the specified form. Self-Determination in Medicine Act,
Cal. S.700, 1979-80 Sess. (1980).
In addition to S.1808, A.2549, sponsored by Elihu Harris (D-Oakland), proposed that
the Act conform to the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. Id. See infra note 82.
The bill died in committee.
80. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100
(Supp. 1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); 1987 ARK. ACTS 713;
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp.
1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to -.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -
12 (1985 & Supp. 1986), amended 1987 Ga. Laws 488; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to
-27 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to
-22 (West Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (West Supp. 1986),
amended H.F. 360, 1987 session, 72nd Iowa General Assembly; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-
28, 101 to -28, 109 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to -.10 (West Supp.
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-31 (Supp. 1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp.
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to -.055 (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-101 to -104, -111, -201 to -206 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to -.690
(1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 3101-11 (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to -.90 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to
-110 (Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h §§ 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1987);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-
62 (1987); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to -:13 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 154.01 to -.15 (West Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp.
1986).
For key provisions in natural death statutes, see SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE,
HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1984 ed. & 1987 ed.) [hereinafter SOCIETY FOR
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years 1985 and 1986 saw an acceleration in living will legislation.
Enactment of the first twenty-three statutes spanned eight years (ten
between 1976 and 1980, and thirteen between 1981 and 1984). An
additional sixteen were adopted within sixteen months between
March 1985 and June 1986.81 Many of the new laws incorporate
some or all of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. 2 A
number of states followed California's lead by enacting similar legis-
lation,83 but other states since have enacted statutes more liberal
and, thus, more conducive to patients who wish to withhold or with-
draw artificial life support."4
The Natural Death Act provides relief from artificial life support
only for competent patients who are certified as terminal and who
then initiate a directive at least fourteen days after diagnosis. The
Natural Death Act does not provide a procedure for terminating
treatment in the case of competent, incompetent or permanently un-
conscious non-terminal patients. Thus, the Natural Death Act would
not have helped Abe Perlmutter, who was competent but not termi-
nal, nor Karen Ann Quinlan, who was incompetent and also not con-
THE RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK].
81. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 5. New
Jersey, the national leader in addressing the legal and ethical dilemmas in the right to
die issue, has yet to enact a single, substantive piece of legislation in this area. Several
pieces of legislation have been introduced but not enacted; for example, in 1985, S-875,
S-935, S-1050, A-182, A-269, A-524, A-1165 were introduced. In 1986, three bills were
introduced: S-33, a Natural Death Act; S-846, a Death With Dignity Act; and A-564, a
Right to Die Act. 202d Legis., Ist Sess. (1986). Instead, the New Jersey Legislature
established the Commission On Legal and Ethical Problems in Delivery of Health Care
to monitor non-treatment court decisions and report to the legislature. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:9Y (West 1986).
82. This Act was drafted by the 95-year-old National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws and approved in 1985. SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE
HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 13-14. See Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, §§
1-18 9B U.L.A. 609 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Uniform Act].
The Uniform Act's directive provides for a declarant's additional instructions; does not
limit who may witness the signing; does not require diagnosis of a terminal condition by
more than one physician; provides that nutrition and hydration may be withdrawn if not
necessary for the patient's comfort or for alleviation of pain; recognizes a directive exe-
cuted in another state; and penalizes physicians who do not comply with the Act. Not
included in the Uniform Act are provisions for a proxy or surrogate or procedures for
decisionmaking on behalf of incompetent patients who have not made a prior declaration.
Id.
83. For example, the Texas Natural Death Act, enacted in 1977, closely followed
the California statute. See Comment, The Recent Amendments to the Texas Natural
Death Act: Implications for Health Care Providers, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1003, 1020-23
(1986).
84. For example, the Texas legislature significantly amended its Natural Death
Act in 1979 and 1985. One change was to eliminate the 14-day waiting period. See also
infra notes 88, 90, 97, 111, 113, 114 and accompanying text for other changes.
sidered terminal.85
By contrast, four states have provided that a directive is binding if
the patient is diagnosed as either terminally ill or permanently un-
conscious, 6 thereby increasing the number of patients who have the
opportunity to withhold or withdraw life support and making it pos-
sible for those who are incompetent as well as competent to deter-
mine their medical treatment.
The Natural Death Act contains no provision for family or a legal
guardian to act on behalf of an incompetent patient who has not
executed a directive,87 thereby forcing the family to resort to time-
consuming and expensive litigation for approval to terminate life
support systems. Many other state statutes specifically recognize the
authority of a proxy, agent or attorney-in-fact who can act for the
incompetent patient.88
The Natural Death Act also does not consider directives executed
85. "The only patients covered by this statute are those who are on the edge of
death despite the doctor's efforts. The very people for whom the greatest concern is ex-
pressed about a prolonged and undignified dying process are unaffected by the statute
because their deaths are not imminent." Capron, The Development of Law On Human
Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 45, 55 (1978).
The original version of the Natural Death Act did not distinguish between a directive
made by a terminally ill patient and one made by a non-terminal patient. The end result
was a compromise. See Cal. A.3060, 1975-76 Session (1976); Stanford Study, supra
note 5, at 922 n.44.
86. 1987 ARK. AcTs. 713, § 1(7); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104; N.M. STAT.
ANN. 5; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.2(8). These states also provide that the directive
may be initiated at any time, including before certification of a terminal illness or a
permanently unconscious state.
87. California's Durable Power of Attorney Statute for Health Care (CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2500 (West 1988) permits a competent individual to designate a surrogate to
make medical treatment decisions, including the right to terminate or withhold any med-
ical procedure, in the event of the patient's incompetency. It is valid for seven years and
can be used in conjunction with the directive authorized by the Natural Death Act.
However, a person must designate a durable power of attorney; otherwise, there is no
legislative guidance as to guardianship requirements once a patient becomes
incompetent).
Under California case law (see Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d, 195 Cal
Rptr. 484 (1983), infra notes 116-128 and accompanying text), an incompetent non-
terminal patient's family can request the removal of life-support equipment without prior
court approval.
Under case law elsewhere, in the absence of a directive, two tests are used to guide
guardians or surrogates. One is the substituted judgment test, in which the patient's fam-
ily makes the argument that the patient would or would not have wanted continuing
medical treatment based on reliable evidence of those views. See Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41,
355 A.2d at 664. See also PREIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 132-34. The second is
the best interests test. Under this standard, used when patients have never been compe-
tent or their wishes are not known with any certainty, the family seeks to implement
what is in the patient's best interests. Factors taken into account include the relief of
suffering, the preservation or restoration of bodily functioning and the quality as well as
the extent of life. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 134-36.
88. See, e.g., 1987 ARK. AcTs 713, § 14; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2505(b);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2; IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590(h), § 4C; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105(2), 75-2-1107.
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before certification of a terminal illness to be binding on the physi-
cian. 9 This eliminates prior planning by a healthy individual for a
future time when he or she may become terminally ill and/or incom-
petent, thus unable at that time to effectuate a directive. Addition-
ally, the Act encourages prior planning which could eliminate confu-
sion and uncertainty on the part of the family, as well as physicians,
as to the patient's wishes for medical treatment. The distinction in
the Natural Death Act between directives made subsequent to the
fourteen-day period and those made prior to the fourteen days also
could involve the courts in reevaluating treatment decisions already
made by the patients.
Many other states allow directives to be executed at any time by
competent individuals.90 Further, only California and Oklahoma spe-
cifically require re-execution of a directive after diagnosis of a termi-
nal illness in order for the directive to be binding.9 1 Often, a pa-
tient's illness precludes him or her from re-executing the directive,
thus leaving the patient with no binding evidence of his or her
wishes, even though the patient had previously executed a directive.
In addition, the Natural Death Act's arbitrary fourteen-day wait-
ing period after diagnosis of terminal illness limits the number of
patients who can benefit from the Act.92 A Stanford University
study indicates that, although the legislature included the fourteen-
day waiting period in the Natural Death Act to ensure that patients
would have time to reflect on their treatment decision, about one-
half of all terminally ill patients die or become unable to sign a di-
rective during those two weeks.93 Thus, the Natural Death Act is of
no benefit to at least one-half of the terminally ill patients who could
potentially take advantage of it. No other state except Colorado
4
requires an arbitrary time period to pass before a patient, after being
certified as terminal, can effectuate a directive.
The Natural Death Act also requires a directive to be re-executed
every five years to remain valid. 5 Since patients can revoke their
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(c).
90. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 3(a); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1104; TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-104; MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-103(1).
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 7191(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3107(c).
92. The Natural Death Act as originally drafted only required a three-day wait-
ing period. The 14-day period was the result of a political compromise with the Pro-Life
Council. Stanford Study, supra note 5, at 923 n.50.
93. Id. at 928.
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104. Period of time is 48 consecutive hours.
95. Natural Death Act, § 7189.5.
directives at any time,"' the requirement seems redundant and bur-
densome. The majority of states provide that a directive remains in
effect until revoked.9
Another problem with the Natural Death Act is that death must
be "imminent"98 before life-support measures may be stopped. Thus,
a patient may be qualified under the Natural Death Act to make a
directive (i.e., fourteen days have passed since the patient was certi-
fied as terminal), but life-support equipment cannot be withdrawn
until the doctor proclaims the patient's death to be imminent. Al-
though "imminent" is not defined in the statute, the Stanford Uni-
versity study indicates that over eighty percent of physicians believe
death is imminent only when it will occur within one week, and
forty-six percent believe it is imminent only when it will occur within
twenty-four hours.99 Therefore, if the doctor's diagnosis of immi-
nence is correct, most patients are spared at best a few days of artifi-
cial life-support. Accordingly, many qualified terminal patients may
die before effecting a binding directive. Various other states define
life-sustaining treatment without requiring death to be imminent. 00
The Natural Death Act prohibits the use of a directive to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining medical care in the event of a terminal
condition if the patient is pregnant. 101 This restriction raises consti-
tutional questions pertaining to the right of privacy. In Roe v. Wade,
the United States Supreme Court held that the fundamental right to
personal privacy, found in the penumbra of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, includes a woman's decision whether to
96. Id. § 7189.
97. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(h), § 5; TENN. CODE ANN. §
32-11-107.
98. See supra note 62 (definition of life-sustaining treatment whereby death must
be imminent). "Imminent" is not defined, but an article quoted by Keene defined immi-
nent as death that will occur in two weeks. Stanford Study, supra note 5, at 921 n.38
(quoting Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not to Resuscitate, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED.
364, 365 (1976)). Keene also has suggested a statutory definition of imminent as 90 days
for terminally ill patients and 180 days for patients in a vegetative state. Id. at 942
n.128.
99. Stanford Study, supra note 5, at 933. The study was conducted a year after
the Natural Death Act went into effect. A questionnaire was mailed to 920 doctors, of
whom 284 responded. Id. at 925.
100. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.100(4); 1987 Ark. Acts 713, § 1(4); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601(E); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(4).
101. Natural Death Act, § 7188. The pregnancy prohibition was a collateral ethi-
cal issue legislators "simply did not want to get involved in." California's Natural Death
Act, 128 W.J. MED. 318, 322 (1978) (quoting Sen. Keene). The clause also was the
result of a political compromise with the Pro-Life Council and the California Conference
of Catholic Health Facilities. Other compromises included tightening the definitions of
"life-sustaining procedures" and "terminal condition," and not fully binding a physician
to a directive if the directive was not signed or reexecuted after the patient was declared
terminally ill. Cartabruno, First Step to Euthanasia? Giving the "right to die" to Cali-
fornia's terminally ill, CAL. J. 217, 218 (July 1976).
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terminate her pregnancy. 102 The Court based its decision on a bal-
ancing of both the woman's and state's interests. The Court held
that during the first trimester, the state cannot regulate an abortion;
during the second trimester, the state can regulate abortion if rea-
sonably related to maternal health; and during the third trimester,
the state's interest in preserving the life of the fetus becomes compel-
ling and the state can regulate or prohibit an abortion.0 3
It would logically follow from Roe that a competent, terminally
ill, pregnant woman could terminate her pregnancy at the same time
she would effectuate her directive during the first six months. In-
stead, the Natural Death Act requires two medical procedures -
the abortion followed by the withdrawal of life support - rather
than the one procedure of withdrawing life support from the
mother.104 Thus, the exemption forces a pregnant woman to remain
on life support for six months against her will. Because of the ques-
tionable constitutionality of a pregnancy clause, twelve other states
either have deleted or excluded such a provision from their
statutes. 0 5
The Natural Death Act also mandates that the patient's directive
precisely follow the prescribed form in the Act.106 The Natural
Death Act does not stipulate what should happen if a person from
another state or even a resident has a similar, but not identical direc-
tive. Should the physician consider such a document binding or only
as evidence of the patient's wishes? This provision requires patients'
102. 410 U.S. at 113, 153 (1973).
103. Id. at 164-65.
104. See D. MEYERS, supra note 35, at 255-56; Note, Statutory Recognition of the
Right to Die: The California Natural Death Act, 57 B.U.L. REV. 148, 165-67 (1977).
Other than to raise the potential unconstitutionality of the pregnancy clause, the
broader issue of pregnant, terminally ill women is beyond the scope of this Comment,
although it is becoming a highly controversial issue nationwide. For example, in June
1987, a terminally ill Washington D.C. patient, identified only as Angie, was forced by a
three-judge appellate panel to undergo a Caesarean section against her will. The baby
girl, delivered in the 26th week of pregnancy, died a few hours after surgery. Angie died
two days later. The American Civil Liberties Union in December 1987 asked the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia to rehear the case, fearing it could set a prece-
dent for courts to make decisions over the objections of pregnant terminally ill women.
See Drama in the Womb: A Matter of Life and Death Winds Up in Court, L.A. Times,
Dec. 25, 1987, Part V-A, at 5, col. 1.
105. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430; IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508; IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to -.10; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921-31; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11; N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 90-320 to -322; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97-050 to -.090; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-
11-101 to -110; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-63; W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to -:13.
106. Natural Death Act, § 7188; see supra note 72.
families to go to court for a ruling on the integrity of the document.
Only three other states require strict adherence to the form of the
directive specified in the statute;10 7 the rest recognize living wills ex-
ecuted out-of-state and/or permit personalized instructions to be at-
tached to the directive.
10 8
The Natural Death Act excludes minors under age eighteen.109
This exclusion is not consistent with court decisions in the abortion
area, where minors, under certain circumstances, are solely responsi-
ble for the decision to abort.110 Statutes in Arkansas, Louisiana,
New Mexico and Texas give statutory authority for execution of a
directive on behalf of a terminally ill minor.111
The Natural Death Act does not specify whether tube-feeding is
included under its definition of life-sustaining procedure, although it
is included under case law.112 This is confusing to individuals or pa-
tients who may consult the Natural Death Act but who may be un-
familiar with California case law. Eighteen other states statutorily
permit the withholding or withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydra-
tion,113 thereby making it easier for those reading the statute to un-
derstand exactly what is considered a life-sustaining procedure.
Four states recognize oral or non-written directives,1 14 whereas
California recognizes only a written directive."85 Recognizing only a
written directive cuts off those competent patients unable to sign a
directive or execute one.
107. IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (1985 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03(2).
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.090; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3202(c);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-25; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2930; MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-9-111.
109. Natural Death Act, § 7188.
110. In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has refused to grant
parents anything resembling a veto power over the child's decision to abort. See Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
111. 1987 ARK. AcTs 713 § 14 § 20-17-214; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6
(West Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-4; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 459h §
4(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
112. Natural Death Act § 7187(c). See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court of appeal held that for the purpose of enforcing the Natural
Death Act, there is no legal difference between the withdrawal of feeding tubes from a
patient and the withdrawal of a respirator. See infra notes 116-28 and accompanying
text.
113. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c); DEL. CODE ANN. titl. 16, 2501(d);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h 2(4); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(4) (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-102(4).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(2)(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3 (West
Supp. 1987); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h § 3(b); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:3.
115. Natural Death Act, § 7188.
[VOL 25: 781. 19881 Death With Dignity
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
VII. CALIFORNIA CASES AFTER PASSAGE OF THE NATURAL
DEATH ACT
A. Barber v. Superior Court 1 '
Clarence Herbert suffered a cardio-respiratory arrest after surgery
for closure of an ileostomy."' As a result, he suffered severe brain
damage and was expected to permanently remain in a vegetative
state.118
Herbert's family drafted a written request to the hospital stating
they wanted life-sustaining machines terminated. Drs. Robert Nejdl
and Neil Barber complied. Herbert continued to breathe without the
equipment but showed no signs of improvement. The doctors, after
consulting with the family, then removed the intravenous tubes pro-
viding fluid and nourishment. From then until his death, Herbert re-
ceived nursing care which provided a clean and hygienic environ-
ment. The doctors were charged by the state with murder and
conspiracy to commit murder." 9
When the case was preliminarily reviewed in the municipal court,
it was dismissed, only to be reversed by the superior court, which
reinstated the murder charges. 120 However, the Second District
Court of Appeal reversed the superior court, noting that since Clar-
ence Herbert had not previously executed a written directive and
was not considered terminal, the Natural Death Act did not apply.
However, the court stated that the Natural Death Act did not pur-
port to be the exclusive means for terminating life-support equip-
ment in the state. The court, thus held that an incompetent non-
terminal patient who has not executed a living will can be taken off
life-support equipment at the request of the family. 2'
116. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
117. An ileostomy is a surgical procedure that creates a passage through the ab-
dominal wall into the ileum, which is part of the small intestine. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (22d ed. 1972).
118. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
119. Id. at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The case represented the first time
murder charges were filed against doctors responsible for withdrawing intravenous
nutrients.
120. Id. at 1011-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
121. Id. at 1015-16, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
The court quoted Natural Death Act § 7193, which provides, "Nothing in this chapter
shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility which any person may
have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful
manner. In such respect the provisions of this chapter are cumulative." The court also
stated that the legislature "has gone part-way, but only part-way, in dealing with this
troublesome issue." Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
The appellate court relied on the concept of proportionality as the
criterion to be used in deciding whether to withdraw life support.
"[P]roportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the patient,
has at least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient,




The Barber court then stated that the "focal point of decision should
be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cognitive
and sapient life, as distinguished from . . . biological vegetative
existence.
1 2 3
The court also concluded that intravenous feeding and hydration is
the same as use of a respirator or other life-support equipment.1 24
Therefore, the removal of life-support equipment was an omission of
further treatment rather than an affirmative act.125 Further, the
court determined that Drs. Nejdl and Barber could not be found
criminally liable for failure to act since there is no duty to continue
treatment "once it has proved to be ineffective.1 26 The court con-
cluded that Herbert's wife was a proper surrogate decision-maker.
There was evidence that Herbert had, prior to his incompetency, ex-
pressed to his wife that he would not want to be kept alive by ma-
chines or "become another Karen Ann Quinlan. '' 27 In the absence
of legislative guidance, the court held that prior judicial approval is
not required before making decisions to withdraw treatment. 28
B. Drabick v. Drabick'
29
William J. Drabick III has been in a persistent vegetative state
since 1983 after receiving severe head injuries in a car accident. He
is in a nursing home and is fed through a nasogastric tube.' 30
One of Drabick's four brothers, David Drabick, was appointed
conservator of the person of William in September 1985; in Decem-
ber, the conservator petitioned the Santa Clara County superior
court for removal of the feeding tube.' In July 1986, the superior
122. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
123. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 45, 355 A.2d at 669).
124. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. "Medical nutrition and hydration may not
always provide net benefits to patients. . .. Their benefits and burdens ought to be eval-
uated in the same manner as any other medical procedure." Id. at 1016-17, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 490.
125. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
126. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
127. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
128. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
129. 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988).
130. Id. at 190, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
131. Id. at 191, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The conservator testified in Superior Court
he was the beneficiary of a $40,000 life insurance policy covering William. The appellate
court stated that a financial interest need not disqualify a conservator since immediate
family members, those most likely chosen as conservators, may often have some benefi-
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court denied the petition, holding that "continued feeding is in the
best interest of a patient who is not brain dead. .. . The Sixth
District Court of Appeal reversed, basing its decision on Barber, and
held that a surrogate may make treatment decisions concerning an
incompetent patient.133
William Drabick did not provide either a written directive under
the Natural Death Act or a durable power of attorney;134 however,
there was substantial evidence that William would not have wanted
to be kept alive by artifical means.135 The court stated that William's
prior statements about medical care were one factor in considering
whether the decision to forego treatment would be consistent with
his best interests.3 6
The court also held that even though the conservator chose to file
a petition and seek the court's approval, 3 7 such approval is not re-
quired for medical treatment decisions.' 38 "[Flaced with a persist-
cial interest and an inflexible rule would eliminate qualified conservators. Id. at 217 n.36,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 861 n. 38.
132. Id. at 193, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
133. Id. at 195, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
Allowing persons to determine their own medical treatment is an important
way in which society respects persons as individuals. Moreover, the respect due
to persons as individuals does not diminish simply because they have become
incapable of participating in treatment decisions. While William's coma pre-
cludes his participation, it is still possible for others to make a decision that
reflects his interests more closely than would a purely technological decision to
do whatever is possible. Lacking the ability to decide, he has a right to a deci-
sion that takes his interests into account.
Id. at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
134. Id. 214, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59. William was not a qualified patient under
the Natural Death Act because he was not considered terminal by his physician and
because he became incompetent immediately after the accident and could not execute a
binding directive. He also could not execute a durable power of attorney since that act
did not become effective until January 1984, almost a year after the accident. Id. at 214-
15, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
135. Id. at 210, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Jeannine C. Gonzalez lived with William
for twelve years and testified that he repeatedly stated he would never want to be kept
alive by artificial means as was his father, a victim of liver cancer. Id. at 192, 245 Cal.
Rptr. at 843.
136. Id. at 218, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
137. Id. at 191, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The conservator filed an unopposed petition
under CAL PROBATE CODE, § 2355 (a). Id., 245 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
138. Id. at 202, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
[W]hen a conservator has authority under [Probate Code] section 2355 for
medical treatment decisions, there is no need for judicial approval absent a
disagreement among the interested persons. When an interested person does
not seek the court's approval, the court's role is limited to determining whether
the conservator has made a good faith decision based upon medical advice.
Id. at 204, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
ently vegetative patient and a diagnosis establishing that further
treatment offers no reasonable hope of returning the patient to cog-
nitive life, the decision whether to continue noncurative treatment is
an ethical one for the physicians and family members .... 13
C. Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Medical
Center)
140
William Bartling, seventy, suffered from emphysema, chronic re-
spiratory failure, arteriosclerosis, an abdominal aneurysm and a ma-
lignant lung tumor. He also had a history of chronic acute anxiety
depression and alcoholism. He had entered Glendale Adventist Med-
ical Center on April 8, 1984 for treatment of his depression. A rou-
tine physical examination and chest x-ray revealed a tumor on his
lung. A biopsy of the tumor was performed by inserting a needle in
the lung, which caused the lung to collapse. Tubes were then in-
serted in his chest and throat to reinflate his lung. However, because
of his emphysema, the hole made by the biopsy needle did not heal
properly and the lung would not reinflate. A tracheotomy was per-
formed and he was placed on a ventilator. Despite repeated requests
from both Bartling and his wife, Glendale Adventist and the treating
physicians refused to remove the ventilator. 41
Bartling had executed a living will and a durable power of attor-
ney,142 but the trial court dismissed the applicability of the Natural
Death Act because the Act provides that the patient must be termi-
nally ill. Bartling's physicians testified his illness was not terminal
and that he could live for at least a year if he were weaned from the
ventilator, although previous efforts to wean him from the machine
had been unsuccessful.1
43
139. Id., 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
140. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984).
141. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
142. Bartling also executed a declaration, which stated in part:
While I have no wish to die, I find intolerable the living conditions forced upon
me by my deteriorating lungs, heart and blood vessel systems, and find intoler-
able my being continuously connected to this ventilator, which sustains my
every breath and my life for the past six and one-half (6 ) weeks. Therefore,
I wish this Court to order that the sustaining of my respiration by this mechan-
ical device violates my constitutional right, is contrary to my every wish, and
constitutes a battery upon my person. I fully understand that my request to
have the ventilator removed and discontinued, which I have frequently made to
my wife and to my doctors, will very likely cause respiratory failure and ulti-
mately lead to my death. I am willing to accept that risk rather than to con-
tinue the burden of this artificial existence which I find unbearable, degrading
and dehumanizing. I also suffer a great deal of pain and discomfort because of
being confined to bed, being on this ventilator, and from other problems which
are occurring.
Id. at 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
143. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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The trial court held that the right to have life-support equipment
disconnected was limited to comatose, terminally ill patients, or rep-
resentatives acting on their behalf. The Second District Court of Ap-
peal reversed and determined that the right to have life-support
equipment disconnected extends to competent patients with serious
illnesses which are incurable but not terminal. 44
The appellate court focused on the legally recognized right to con-
trol one's own medical treatment asserted in a long line of California
cases, starting with Cobbs v. Grant.4 5 The court stated that this pri-
vacy right is specifically guaranteed by the California Constitution,
and is also found to exist in the penumbra of rights guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. 46 The court
also relied on the Natural Death Act, which provides in part that
adult persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions re-
lated to their own medical care.
147
The court then applied a balancing test to determine whether
Bartling's right to refuse unwanted treatment as a competent adult
was outweighed by state interests in preserving life, maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession, and preventing suicide.
The court concluded that the right of a competent patient to refuse
treatment is a constitutionally guaranteed right which must not be
abridged.148 Disconnecting Bartling's ventilator was not tantamount
144. Id. 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The day before the appellate court's decision, Wil-
liam Bartling, after lapsing into a coma, died of complications suffered due to kidney
failure. The court decided to render an opinion in the case despite its mootness in order
to formulate guidelines for similar situations in the future. Id. at 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
221.
145. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972) (In California, "a
person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his
own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.").
146. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 194-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and. . . pursuing and obtaining. . . privacy." CAL. CO NST., art. 1, at
1.
147. Natural Death Act, § 7186. However, the court agreed with the court in Bar-
ber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, that the Natural Death Act applies to
only a limited number of terminally ill patients and that the procedural requirements of
the act are "so cumbersome that it is unlikely that any but a small number of highly
educated and motivated patients will be able to effectuate their desire." Id. at 1015, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 489.
148. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
The most significant of these [state] interests is the preservation of life. This
is of prime concern to Glendale Adventist Medical Center which submitted a
declaration to the effect that it is a Christian, pro-life oriented hospital, the
majority of whose doctors would view disconnecting a life-support system in a
case such as this one as inconsistent with the healing orientation of physicians
to aiding a suicide, but merely hastened his inevitable death by natu-
ral causes. The court made a distinction between the self-infliction of
deadly harm by unnatural causes, which is suicide, and a self-deter-
mination to withhold or withdraw artificial life-support, which is
not.1
4 9
D. Bouvia v. Superior Court'50
Elizabeth Bouvia suffers from severe cerebral palsy and as a re-
sult, is quadriplegic and completely bedridden. At age twenty-eight,
she became a patient at a public hospital in Los Angeles County. 1"
Except for mobility in a few fingers on one hand and slight head and
facial movements, she was totally immobile, physically helpless, and
totally dependent upon others for all of her needs, including feeding,
washing, toileting and turning. She could not stand or sit upright in
bed or in a wheelchair. After the medical and dietary staff at the
hospital determined Bouvia was not consuming sufficient nutrients,
she was force-fed through a nasogastric tube.a' 2 Bouvia filed a peti-
tion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary and perma-
nent injunctions, requesting the court to enjoin the hospital from
force-feeding her. The trial court declined to issue an injunction and
considered Bouvia's motives to be an attempt to commit suicide with
the state's help." 3 Bouvia appealed.
The Second District Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of
mandate ordering the trial court to immediately grant Bouvia's re-
quest for removal of the nasogastric tube. 54 The appellate court
found that the "trial court [had] mistakenly attached undue impor-
tance to the amount of time available to [Bouvia] . . ." rather than
"the quality of that life .... ."15' The court also disagreed with the
However, if the right of the patient to self-determination as to his own
medical treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the
interests of the patient's hospital and doctors.
Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
149. Id. at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
150. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
151. High Desert Hospital in Lancaster, California.
152. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135-36, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. The hospital
noted that Bouvia was not terminal, nor comatose nor in a vegetative state - all condi-
tions which have justified the termination of life-support equipment in other cases - and
that she could continue to live for another fifteen to twenty years with sufficient nourish-
ment. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
153. Id. at 1134-35, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 298-99.
154. Id. at 1146, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
155. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (emphasis in original). The court states:
We do not believe it is the policy of this state that all and every life must be
preserved against the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous,
for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that someone
else must live, or, more accurately, endure, for '15 to 20 years.' We cannot
conceive it to be the policy of this state to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone.
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trial court's conclusion that Bouvia wanted to commit suicide. The
appellate court reasoned that since Bouvia's condition had worsened
to the point where she could no longer eat independently, her deci-
sion to withdraw from the nasogastric feedings should be construed
merely as a choice of an earlier death without force-feeding, not as a
suicide. 156
The court further disagreed with the trial court's determination
that the state-supported hospital would be assisting suicide by adher-
ing to Bouvia's request to stop force-feeding her. The court clarified
that there is a distinction between aiding and abetting suicide and
merely being present during the exercise of a patient's constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment.'51 The court concluded that no
criminal or civil liability would attach to a doctor or hospital by hon-
oring the refusal of medical treatment by a competent patient.158
Like the court in Bartling, the Bouvia court extended the right to
die beyond the mandate of the Natural Death Act by holding that
even a competent patient who is not terminally ill has the right to
refuse any medical treatment, even that which may save or prolong
life, including nourishment and hydration. 5 '
Barber, Drabick, Bartling and Bouvia indicate the Natural Death
Act may be drawn too narrowly to be practically applied to cases in
which patients are not terminally ill, but whose grave and irreversi-
ble medical condition seriously impairs their quality of life. Within
twelve years of the Natural Death Act's passage, appellate courts in
four major cases have expanded the right to die beyond the limited
competent terminal patient requirement in the Act. Under case law,
competent non-terminal patients, as well as incompetent non-termi-
nal patients (by way of a surrogate), can refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, including food and water.
Id. at 1143-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
156. Id. at 1144-45, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. Furthermore, the court stated that the
trial court erred in basing its decision on the motive behind Bouvia's decision. "If a right
exists, it matters not what 'motivates' its exercise. We find nothing in the law to suggest
the right to refuse medical treatment may be exercised only if the patient's motives meet
someone else's approval. Id. 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306 (emphasis in original).
Elizabeth Bouvia, now 30, is still alive and eating and living in an isolation room at
County-University of Southern California Medical Center. She watches television, sees
friends weekly, but gave up reading because she doesn't have the strength to hold books.
Controlling the End: Right-to-Die Laws Take on New Life, L.A. Times, May 23, 1988,
Part I, at 14, col. 1. "The thought of being here another 10 years, I just can't fathom. I
just take it one day at a time... I would rather be dead than lie here." Id.
157. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
158. Id. 225 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
159. Id. at 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
Apart from expanding the Natural Death Act to cover non-termi-
nal patients, some proponents believe the Act should be expanded to
permit a physician, under certain stringent circumstances and at the
request of a patient, to aid a terminal patient in dying.1 0
VIII. Two PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THE NATURAL DEATH ACT
A. The Dignified Death Act
On September 20, 1987, the California State Bar's Conference of
Delegates narrowly adopted Resolution 3-4-87 (Resolution),8 1
which advocates giving doctors permission to help terminally ill pa-
tients, upon their request, end their lives.
16 2
The Resolution advocates changing the Natural Death Act to the
Dignified Death Act and permits patients to seek a doctor's help in
dying if: (1) two physicians, one of which is the attending physician,
certify the patient is terminal and will die within six months, absent
life-sustaining procedures;163 (2) a psychiatrist determines the pa-
tient is competent and is voluntarily making such a decision for the
purpose of ending physical pain and suffering resulting from the ter-
minal condition; 6 4 (3) the patient makes the request in writing, fol-
lowing exactly the request form contained in the Resolution; 65 and
(4) the patient waits ten days and then orally requests aid-in-
dying.
1 66
The Resolution gives the physician the right to administer aid-in-
dying, at the patient's request, by lethal dosage of a prescription
drug.161 The Resolution also eliminates criminal penalities for physi-
cians who render such aid; 68 however, an attending physician may
refuse to administer aid-in-dying to a qualified patient, but must
160. See infra notes 161-81 and accompanying text.
161. Resolution, supra note 14.
162. Right-to-Die' Resolution Okd by Bar Group, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1987,
Part 1, at 3, col. 4. The vote was 282-239. The resolution was sponsored by the Beverly
Hills Bar Ass'n. The 19,000-member Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n., among others, op-
posed the Resolution.
163. Resolution, supra note 14 § 7195 (a). The Resolution amends CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-87 and 7195, and adds §§ 7195.1, 7195.2 and 7195.3. The rest
of the present Natural Death Act would remain the same and would be incorporated into
the Dignified Death Act.
Under the Resolution, the patient must remain conscious and, thus, be able to revoke
the request up to the day aid is given. The objective is to insure that patients have care-
fully considered their options and are acting voluntarily to end uncontrollable physical
pain and not in response to mental depression or from fear of being a burden to others.
Resolution, supra note 14, Statement of Reasons.
164. Resolution at § 7195 (c).
165. Id. at § 7195 (d).
166. Id. at § 7195, Request to Physician for Aid in Dying.
167. Id.
168. Id. at § 7195.2.
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promptly notify the patient of the refusal.169 The Resolution also
states that an aid-in-dying request by a qualified patient will not
constitute a suicide.
170
B. The Humane and Dignified Death Act Initiative
The Humane and Dignified Death Act Initiative (Initiative) is
sponsored by Americans Against Human Suffering, Inc."'7 and is
similar to the Resolution. Both permit a terminally ill patient, who is
certified by two physicians that death is likely within six months, to
request physician aid-in-dying. Both exonerate physicians from all
criminal liability. Both permit aid-in-dying by a physician only, and
both exclude children or pregnant women. Both provide that a direc-
tive has no force if the patient is in a nursing home or similar facility
unless one of the two witnesses to the directive is a state-designated
patient advocate or ombudsman. Both provide that the making of a
directive Will not affect the terms of an existing life insurance policy
or the procurement of such a policy. Neither requires a physician to
administer aid-in-dying if he or she is morally or ethically
opposed. 7 2
There are differences, however. The Resolution requires an exami-
nation of the terminal patient by a psychiatrist to ensure the pa-
tient's competency, while the Initiative requires a declaration of dis-
interested witnesses 7 a that the patient is of sound mind and is not
acting under duress. Under the Resolution, the request form expires
six months from the date of execution; the directive in the Initiative
expires after seven years. The Resolution's request form is signed
after the patient is certified as terminal; the patient must then wait
169. Id. at § 7195.1.
170. Id. at § 7195.3.
171. Americans Against Human Suffering, Inc., is a non-profit organization, head-
quartered in Glendale, Cal., and was established on July 18, 1986 to change state laws to
permit physician aid-in-dying for the terminally ill. The organization had hoped to place
the Humane and Dignified Death Act Initiative (Initiative), two years in the works, on
the November 1988 ballot but fell short of the required number of signatures. The group
will try again on the 1990 ballot (Initiative on file with the San Diego Law Review). See,
supra note 4, at vii, INITIATIVE HANDBOOK (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
172. See the Humane & Dignified Death Act Initiative leaflet, which compares the
two. The leaflet was prepared by Robert L. Risley, president of the Americans Against
Human Suffering, Inc., and author of the Initiative, supra note 15, and the INITIATIVE
HANDBOOK, supra note 4. See also Initiative, supra note 15, and Resolution, supra note
14.
173. Disinterested witnesses are two individuals not related to the patient by blood
or marriage, not entitled to any portion of the patient's estate, and not an attending
physician. Initiative, supra note 15, at § 2525.3.
ten days before a physician administers aid-in-dying. The Initiative's
directive can be signed in advance of the terminal illness by a com-
petent person who is not yet qualified to receive a physician's aid-in-
dying. 
7 4
The Resolution mandates that only a competent patient may re-
quest aid-in-dying; the Initiative permits an attorney-in-fact to initi-
ate the request if the patient becomes incompetent, as long as the
patient has so provided in the directive.175 The Initiative also permits
a separate page for special instructions by the declarant to be at-
tached to the directive.
176
174. Id. at § 2526.5.
175. Id. at § 2525.2 (i). This surrogate provision is a carryover of the Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care and thereby combines the California Natural Death
Act and the Durable Power of Attorney into one law. In addition, the surrogate's deci-
sion must be reviewed by a three-member ethics committee. INITIATIVE HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, at 16, 18, 19.
176. Id. at Directive to Physicians, Instructions. This provision enables patients to,
for example, specify a certain drug they prefer used, a specific time to die or those per-
sons they desire present. Interview with Michael H. White, member of Americans
Against Human Suffering (Dec. 29, 1987) [hereinafter White Interview].
The Initiative's Instructions within the Directive to Physicians, which must be followed
exactly, are as follows:
I, being of sound mind, willfully and vol-
untarily make known my desire
(a) - That my life shall not be artificially prolonged and
(b) - That my life shall be ended with the aid of a physician under the
circumstances set forth below, and do hereby declare: (You must initial (a) or
(b), or both).
1. If at any time I should have a terminal condition or illness certified to be
terminal by two physicians, and they determine that my death will occur
within six months,
(a) - I direct that life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and
(b) - I direct that my physician administer aid-in-dying in a humane and
dignified manner. (You must initial (a) or (b) or both).
(c) - I have attached Special Instructions on a separate page to the direc-
tive. (Initial if you have attached a separate page.) The action taken under this
paragraph shall be at the time of my own choosing if I am competent.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the termination of
my life, it is my intention that this directive shall be honored by my family,
agent (described in paragraph 5), and physician(s) as the final expression of
my legal right to
(a) - Refuse medical or surgical treatment, and
(b) - To choose to die in a humane and dignified manner. (You must initial
(a) or (b), or both and you must initial one box below.)
- If I am unable to give directions, I do not want my attorney-in-fact to
request aid-in-dying.
- If I am unable to give directions, I do want my attorney-in-fact to ask my
physician for aid-in-dying.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and the diagnosis is known to my
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my
pregnancy.
4. I understand that a terminal condition is one in which I am not likely to live
for more than six months.
5. a. I, , do hereby designate and appoint
as my attorney-in-fact (agent) to make health-
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C. Opposition to the Resolution and the Initiative
If either the Resolution or the Initiative are enacted, it would be
the first time any country in the world has advocated physician aid-
care decisions for me if I am in a coma or otherwise unable to decide for
myself as authorized in this document. For the purpose of this document,
"health-care decision" means consent, refusal to consent, or withdrawal of con-
sent to any care, treatment, service or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat
an individual's physical or mental condition, or to administer aid-in-dying.
b. By this document I intend to create a durable power of attorney for health
care under the Humane and Dignified Death Act and sections 2430 to 2443,
inclusive, of the Civil Code. This power of attorney shall not be affected by my
subsequent incapacity, except by revocation.
c. Subject to any limitations in this document, I hereby grant to my agent full
power and authority to make health-care decisions for me to the same extent
that I could make these decisions for myself if I had the capacity to do so. In
exercising this authority, my agent shall make health-care decisions that are
consistent with my desires as stated in this document or otherwise made known
to my agent, including, but not limited to, my desires concerning obtaining,
refusing, or withdrawing life-prolonging care, treatment, services and proce-
dures, and administration of aid-in-dying.
c. Subject to any limitations in this document, I hereby grant to my agent full
power and authority to make health-care decisions for me to the same extent
that I could make these decisions for myself if I had the capacity to do so. In
exercising this authority, my agent shall make health-care decisions that are
consistent with my desires as stated in this document or otherwise made known
to my agent, including, but not limited to, my desires concerning obtaining,
refusing, or withdrawing life-prolonging care, treatment, services and proce-
dures, and administration of aid-in-dying.
6. This directive shall have no force or effect seven years from the date filled in
above, unless I am incompetent to act on my own behalf and then it shall
remain valid until my competency is restored.
7. I recognize that a physician's judgment is not always certain, and that medi-
cal science continues to make progress in extending life, but in spite of these
facts, I nevertheless wish aid-in-dying rather than letting my terminal condi-
tion take its natural course.
8. My family has been informed of my request to die, their opinions have been
taken into consideration, but the final decision remains mine, so long as I am
competent.
9. The exact time of my death will be determined by me and my physician
with my desire or my attorney-in-fact's instructions paramount.
I have given full consideration and understand the full import of this direc-
tive, and I am emotionally and mentally competent to make this directive. I
accept the moral and legal responsibility for receiving aid-in-dying.
This directive will not be valid unless it is signed by two qualified witnesses
who are present when you sign or acknowledge your signature. The witnesses
must not be related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption: they must not be
entitled to any part of your estate; and they must not include a physician or
other person responsible for, or employed by anyone responsible for, your
health care. If you have attached any additional pages to this form, you must
date and sign each of the additional pages at the same time you date and sign
this power of attorney.
in-dying through legislation. 7 The initiators of both measures are
aware of the sizable opposition to such measures.17 8 The objections
include the potential for abuse and the "slippery slope" argument.
For example, potential for abuse centers around the possibility of
fraud, coercion or duress in requests for aid-in-dying.:1 9 The "slip-
pery slope" argument cautions against taking a first step that ethi-
cally may be justified but which might lead to subsequent unjustified
actions.' 80 These objections have been somewhat surmounted in the
City, County, and State of Residency
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the per-
son who signed or acknowledged this document is personally known to me (or
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the declarant of this
directive; that he or she signed and acknowledged this directive in my presence;
that he or she appears to be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or
undue influence; that I am not a health-care provider, an employee of a health-
care provider, the operator of a community-care facility, nor an employee or an









177. White Interview, supra note 176. Physician aid-in-dying is another term for
"euthanasia," which is defined as "the act or practice of painlessly putting to death per-
sons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an act of mercy." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979).
178. Interview with Barry E. Shanley, author of Res. 3-4-87 and member of the
Beverly Hills Bar Ass'n (May 29, 1988). It was not likely the State Bar Board of Gover-
nors would support the controversial Resolution because of the political climate, and al-
though legislators' interest was solicited, a sponsor was not asked to introduce the Reso-
lution during the 1987-88 session. The Beverly Hills Bar Ass'n expects to reintroduce the
issue next session.
The Initiative was sent to the Attorney General's Office, and a title and summary
prepared. To qualify for the ballot, 372,000 signatures were needed by May 11, 1988,
but only 150,000 were gathered. White Interview. See also 'Humane, Dignified Death
Act' May Be Headed for June Ballot, L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 20, 1987, Part 1, at 2,
col. 1; Bringing Euthanasia Issue to the Ballot Box, L.A. Times, Apr. 10, 1987, Part V,
at 1, col. 1. Various groups have already signaled opposition to physician aid-in-dying:
the California Medical Ass'n, the American Medical Ass'n, the Hastings Center, right-
to-life groups, the Catholic Church, and the President's Comm'n. See materials distrib-
uted by Inyo-Mono County Bar Associations to Conference of Delegates (on file with the
San Diego Law Review).
179. INITIATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, acknowledges the specter of a malevo-
lent, greedy relative encouraging a patient to end his or her life. However, Risley points
to the safeguards in the Initiative: only physicians will be permitted to aid patients in
dying, witnesses to the directive cannot be heirs or beneficiaries, and the directive can be
revoked at any time. See INITIATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 15.
180. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 2, at 28-30. For example, some fear that
euthanasia eventually will lead to the killing of the severely disabled or the incapacitated
elderly, as during the Nazi regime fifty years ago. See Alexander, Medical Science
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Netherlands. 181
D. The Netherlands Approach
Physician-assisted suicide is an international controversy. It is ille-
gal in Western Europe but unofficially condoned in the Netherlands.
The government of the Netherlands is considering formally legaliz-
ing the practice by legislation." 2
Dutch doctors are not punished for giving a lethal injection to a
dying person who has requested death. Rather than legalize mercy
killing through Parliament, the Dutch have, in a series of judicial
steps since 1973, permitted doctors to go unpunished. 83 An esti-
mated 2,000 Dutch doctors. (out of 17,000) practice various degrees
of euthanasia, but the handful of cases (thirty-six) that have come to
official notice indicates that most doctors keep their actions secret.'
84
Government polls suggest that more than three-quarters of the
Dutch population supports euthanasia and that an estimated 7,000
people die by euthanasia each year.'85
One factor in explaining why the Netherlands has made such ad-
vances in accepting aid-in-dying, as compared to the relative inactiv-
ity in other Western countries, is that no single church plays a domi-
nant role in the country. In fact, twenty-seven percent of the Dutch
population claims no religious denomination. 8
IX. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NATURAL DEATH ACT
A. Amendments Which Clarify or Expand Existing
Provisions in the Act
The legislature should reevaluate the Natural Death Act with an
eye toward broadening its provisions. One commentator' 87 has sug-
Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENG. J. MED 39 (1949); D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETT,
supra note 4, at 20-32. On the other hand, "[a]ll social policy requires the drawing of
lines .... Prohibitions have to be established and distinctions made even where human
affairs are uncertain and hard to classify." S. BOK, DEATH & DYING: EUTHANASIA &
SUSTAINING LIFE, ETHICAL VIEWS, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BioEaIICs 268, 277 (1978).
181. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
182. See L.A. Times, supra note 178, at 1.
183. D. HUMPHRY & A. WICKETr, supra note 4, at 170.
184. Id. at 176.
185. Id. at 179.
186. Id. at 180.
187. Shulman, Death with Dignity: The Courts Enforce Public Policy, BEVERLY
HILLS B.J. 236-39 (Fall 1984).
gested that modifications in the Natural Death Act are not necessary
in order for the purposes of that Act to be fulfilled because Barber'88
and Bartling'89 have filled in the gaps; thus, the developing case law
upholding the patient's right to death with dignity and providing
freedom from liability for physicians is adequately solving the
problems. 190 Another commentator said the Natural Death Act may
have been "the first in the world, but it was a mess. It was savaged
by opponents and it came out a dog's breakfast." " '
Among the reasons cited for enactment of the statute was the con-
cern that although common law precedent did exist that allowed an
individual to exercise choice over what medical treatment he or she
would consent to, such authority was sparse and limited to the facts
of a given case. 19' The result has been uncertainty by physicians' 93
and attorneys as to the application of the common law precedent.
Courts are ill-equipped to provide rules, procedures, forms, guidance,
penalties and sanctions for abuse. Rules for witnessing, revocation,
appointment of attorneys-in-fact and immunizing physicians from li-
ability need to be drawn by the legislature. T The legislature also
embodies the public will and possesses the resources to investigate
proposed laws. 95
The principle of the Natural Death Act - that individuals have
the fundamental right to control decisions concerning their own med-
ical care - has been upheld by the courts.196 But the Natural Death
Act limits itself to a narrow range of patients who are competent
188. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); see supra notes 116-28
and accompanying text.
189. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); see supra notes 140-49 and
accompanying text.
190. Shulman, supra note 187, at 238.
191. L.A. Times, supra note 156, at 14. (quoting Derek Humphry, founder and
Executive Director of the Hemlock Society).
192. See Natural Death Act, § 7186. "The legislature further finds that there ex-
ists considerable uncertainty in the medical and legal professions as to the legality of
terminating the use or application of life-sustaining procedures . . . ." Id.
193. In a survey conducted by the California Medical Education and Research
Foundation of the California Medical Ass'n one year after passage of the Natural Death
Act, physicians noted they had difficulty in interpreting sections of the Act; 17 percent
thought the Natural Death Act's language should-be clarified. A questionnaire was
mailed to 168 physicians in 1977; 112 replies were received, or a response rate of 68
percent. 128 W.J. MED. 329-330 (1978).
194. See INITIATIVE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 11-12.
As Judge Compton said in Barber:
[T]he only long-term solution to this problem is necessarily legislative in na-
ture. It is that body which must address the moral, social, ethical, medical and
legal issues raised by cases such as the one at bench. [Tihis court cannot at-
tempt to reunite the statutory definition of death or set forth guidelines cover-
ing all possible future cases.
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
195. Riga, supra note 17, at 107.
196. See, e.g., Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1132, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
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and terminally ill. It is only these patients who can end their suffer-
ing by terminating life-support systems. The Natural Death Act suf-
fers from ambiguous language which makes its provisions unclear
and confusing. For example, it is not clear from the Act when death
is "imminent," and so qualified patients may be spared only a few
days of artificial life support .
97
The Natural Death Act has not been flexible enough to keep up
with case law. Physicians, hospital and nursing home administrators
and personnel, and attorneys are now required to assimilate a wide
spectrum of case law which has interpreted and fleshed out the Nat-
ural Death Act in order to get an accurate picture of the state of the
right to die law. Such assimilation poses an unfair burden on any
party, especially the average person on the street interested in learn-
ing how to apply the Act.
At the very least, the Natural Death Act should be amended to
make it current with case law. Such amendments would include pro-
viding that any medical treatment, including life support and intra-
venous fluid and nourishment, may be removed for (1) non-terminal
incompetent or permanently unconscious patients at the request of
family or other surrogate, or (2) non-terminal competent patients.
The following amendments are suggested in order to increase the
number of patients who can take advantage of the Act, and to clear
up ambiguous language.
1. The Directive Should Be Able To Be Executed and
Be Binding Before a Patient Is Certified as Terminal, as
well as After Such a Certification.
An individual is capable of more rational thought before a termi-
nal diagnosis. A person who executes a directive while still healthy
has probably put much serious thought into the decision before the
advent of traumatic illness. On the other hand, a newly diagnosed
terminal patient may be overwhelmed by the diagnosis and confused.
Pain-killing drugs may impair reasoning. Also, a directive executed
before a patient becomes terminal indicates to the family the pa-
tient's wishes in case he or she becomes incompetent before the di-
rective is executed. Since a directive can be revoked at any time, a
patient could still change his or her mind after being diagnosed as
terminal. Therefore, the definition of a qualified patient'98 should be
197. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 62.
changed in the Natural Death Act to include an individual who has
previously executed a directive, as well as a patient who has been
diagnosed as terminal.
2. The Provision Which Requires a Fourteen-Day
Period After Diagnosis of Terminal Illness Before a
Patient Can Initiate a Directive Should Be Revoked.
The rationale of the legislature for including the fourteen-day re-
quirement 19 was the belief that once diagnosis of a terminal condi-
tion was made, the patient needed that time to make an objective
decision about treatment. 20 0 However, if a person has objectively ex-
ecuted a directive while still healthy and competent, there is no need
for a two-week waiting period, especially since a directive can be
revoked at any time. Even for those patients who have not previously
executed a directive, such a provision is not beneficial. If a signifi-
cant number of terminal patients die during those fourteen days or
are unable to sign a directive, the Natural Death Act becomes use-
less and they are not able to choose to terminate life support. Also,
some physicians may delay telling patients of a terminal condition,
thus preventing patients from executing binding directives which
could save them at least some time of suffering while on life-support
equipment.
If a directive previously has been executed, it should be binding on
the physician as soon as the patient is diagnosed as terminal. If a
patient is diagnosed as terminal and then executes a directive, the
directive should be binding immediately. Thus, a patient is able to
withhold or withdraw life support at once and is spared needless fur-
ther suffering.
3. The Natural Death Act Should Provide an
Opportunity for Permanently Unconscious, as well as
Terminally Ill Patients, to Withhold or Withdraw Life-
Support Equipment.2 10
Often, permanently unconscious patients, though they may not be
terminal, have the same dismal prognosis for recovery as terminally
ill patients. "Permanently unconscious" could be defined as an incur-
able condition caused by injury or disease in which thought, feeling
and awareness of performance and environment are absent.202 The
Natural Death Act should explicitly state, following Bartling and
Bouvia, that those competent patients with incurable, but not termi-
199. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
200. See Comment, supra note 11, at 599.
201. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., 1987 ARK. AcTs 713, § I(11).
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nal, diseases, have the right to withhold or withdraw life-support
equipment. 03 Therefore, a "qualified patient" would need to be
redefined in the Natural Death Act to include those diagnosed as
permanently unconscious as well as terminal.
4. The Natural Death Act Should Provide that the
Decision to Terminate Life Support Can Be Made by a
Surrogate for an Incompetent Terminal or Non-
Terminal Patient Who Has Not Executed a Directive
and Who Has Not Authorized a Durable Power of
Attorney. °4
Even though Barber and Drabick held that an incompetent non-
terminal patient's family could request the removal of life-support
equipment, this specific provision should be incorporated into the
Natural Death Act to make it less susceptible to varied judicial in-
terpretation. Guardianship requirements should be explicitly stated
in the Act so that interested individuals or patients know exactly
what may occur if they become incompetent. Substituted consent
could eliminate the need for costly and time-consuming litigation in
an attempt to have life-support systems removed, and would, there-
fore, reduce the likelihood of a patient's prolonged suffering. Substi-
tuted consent would also decrease a physician's fear of liability.
Under a surrogate proposal, even if a directive does not exist, a phy-
sician cannot be charged with criminal homicide after removing life-
support systems if the decision to do so was made jointly by the phy-
sician, the patient's family, and/or a hospital ethics committee.
Such a guardianship provision could allow the attending physician
and family of the patient to make a treatment decision based on
knowledge of what the patient would desire, if known, or what would
be the patient's best interest.0 5 A treatment decision could be made
by one or more of the following, in order of priority: the patient's
spouse, a majority of the adult children, the patient's parents, the
nearest relative. The court's intervention should only be resorted to
when the family members cannot agree on a treatment decision,
when there is no family, or when the patient has never been compe-
tent and there is no legal guardian. Then a court hearing and ap-
pointment of a guardian is necessary. Thus, "incompetent" could be
203. See supra notes 140-49 and 150-58 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 87.
defined to include the permanently unconscious. For those who have
appointed a durable power of attorney or legal guardian, it should be
stated in the Natural Death Act that such surrogates can effect the
wishes of the incompetent patient.
5. The Provision That a Directive Must Be Re-
executed Every Five Years in Order To Be Effective 0
Should Be Revoked.
This provision is especially burdensome to young adults who exe-
cute a directive and then must remember to re-execute it every five
years for the rest of their lives. Such a requirement will undoubtedly
lead to litigation concerning previous directives. Also, a patient's ill-
ness or injury may prevent him or her from re-executing the direc-
tive, thereby leaving the patient with no binding evidence of his or
her wishes. Directives should remain valid until revoked. For individ-
uals who execute a directive and then become competent terminal or
non-terminal patients, a change of heart or a past intent to revoke
not acted upon can be rectified by simply revoking the directive. In
circumstances where individuals executed directives and then in-
tended to revoke them but did not (i.e. due to forgetfulness or pro-
crastination) before becoming incompetent, the surrogate provision
proposed above should provide protection as long as the patient had
expressed the change of heart to family members.
6. The Term "Imminent" Included in the Natural
Death Act's Definition of Life-Sustaining Procedure
Should Be Dropped.1
0 7
The lack of definition of "imminent" in the statute only leads to
confusion. The term offers no guidance for those patients whose phy-
sicians believe imminent means twenty-four hours, or at most a few
days, until death. Defining "imminent" as a certain time period,
such as six months, would also be ineffective for two reasons. First,
most physicians would feel uncomfortable diagnosing a patient's
death that far in advance.208 Second, most patients certified as ter-
minal, and on life-support equipment, have a very limited time to
live. A patient (or surrogate) should be able to terminate life support
as soon as he or she effects a directive or is certified as terminal or
permanently unconscious, thus getting the maximum benefit out of
the statute. The time sequence from execution of a directive through
withdrawal of treatment should be clearly stated in the Natural
206. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
208. Stanford Study, supra note 5, at 942 n.130.
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Death Act, rather than determined by piecing together the various
definitions in the Act. Life-sustaining procedure can be defined in
the Natural Death Act without requiring death to be imminent. 09
For example, a life-sustaining procedure could be "any medical pro-
cedure or intervention that, when administered to a qualified patient,
will serve only to prolong the dying process or to maintain the pa-
tient in a condition of permanent unconsciousness."21 0
7. The Pregnancy Clause Should Be Restated as an
Optional Clause.
Since the pregnancy clause21" is of questionable constitutionality,
restating it as an optional clause would protect the state from claims
of violation of substantive due process. If a patient wants to mandate
that life-support systems should not be terminated if she is pregnant,
she could include that clause in the directive. If not, the clause can
be excluded. Alternatively, the Natural Death Act could be
amended to prohibit only the withholding or withdrawal of life sup-
port from a pregnant woman in the last trimester.
8. The Mandate That the Directive Must be Followed
Directly Should be Revoked.212
Individuals should be able to include special individualized in-
structions,213 such as who they want to appoint as surrogate deci-
sionmaker if they become incompetent, and also to exclude clauses
not desired. Although in some cases there may be a need for judicial
determination of the integrity of a non-standard directive, a non-
standard option would be in keeping with the legislature's intent that
individuals have the right to control their own medical care deci-
sions. The Natural Death Act's standardized form may minimize in-
terpretation difficulties, but it also creates inconvenience for patients
who wish to express their desires in more detail. A non-standard
form creates more flexibility as to treatment choice. A provision
should also be included in the Natural Death Act to honor out-of-
state patients' directives which comply with laws in other
jurisdictions.
209. See supra note 62 (current definition).
210. See, e.g., 1987 ARK. AcTs 713, § 1(4).
211. See supra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
9. Minors Should Not Be Excluded from the
Provisions of the Act.
214
Minors should also have the opportunity to alleviate suffering on
life-support equipment. Surrogates should be able to act on the be-
half of either incompetent terminal minors, including the perma-
nently unconscious, who either have or have not executed a directive,
or competent terminal minors who have executed a directive. Surro-
gates could be designated as either a minor's spouse over eighteen, a
parent or a legal guardian. If a minor has no family, a legal guard-
ian could be appointed to represent the minor and an evidentiary
court hearing could be held to certify that the directive was executed
in good faith.
10. The Natural Death Act Should Specify Under
Section 7187(c) That Nutrition and Fluids Can Be
Withdrawn.2"'
This specification would be in keeping with the California appel-
late court's decision in Barber."' Alternatively, the Natural Death
Act could provide in the directive an optional nutrition/fluid clause
which patients or individuals could choose to include.
11. The Natural Death Act Should Provide for Oral
or Non-Written Directives.
21 7
Oral directives should be allowed for those competent, qualified
patients unable to sign a directive or make a written one. Non-writ-
ten directives would include blinking eyes or a shake of the head in
answer to certain questions, or even a video directive. Such directives
could be executed in front of an attending physician and two wit-
nesses with the same qualifications as those required for witnessing a
written directive. Physicians can then make a note in the patient's
chart and the directive becomes as binding as a written one. An oral
or non-written directive could also be revoked at any time.
12. The Natural Death Act Should Define Clearly
What Procedures Are Considered Life-Sustaining.
Life-sustaining procedures should be defined so physicians can ap-
ply them uniformly, and so interested persons know exactly what
may be withheld or withdrawn. For example, under the Natural
Death Act section 7187(c), does a "mechanical or other artificial
214. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
216. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
217. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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means" of life-sustaining procedure include resuscitation, respirators
and intravenous hydration and feeding?
X. PROPOSAL WHICH EXPANDS THE NATURAL DEATH ACT TO
INCLUDE PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING
This Comment supports the Humane and Dignified Death Act In-
itiative218 with some revision. The Natural Death Act should be ex-
panded to include physician aid-in-dying by lethal injection if re-
quested by a competent, terminal (certified to die within six months)
patient, by a competent person who had executed a directive prior to
terminal illness, or by a now incompetent terminal patient who has
previously executed a directive while competent and who provided
for a surrogate. In addition, the Natural Death Act should guaran-
tee that physicians will not be criminally liable for assisting a patient
to die at the patient's request.219
Proponents of physician aid-in-dying - or the right to reject the
continuation of life that is supported only by artificial life support
devices or made bearable from the pain of incurable illness by drugs
- submit that such aid is a constitutional right that exists within
the "penumbras" of the fundamental right to privacy.220 Privacy has
been viewed by the United States Supreme Court as a fundamental
aspect of personal liberty.221 Liberty, or freedom, not only is freedom
from restraint but also is the ability to choose a destiny and to have
that decision respected by others.222 The right to be left alone223
should include this "right" of a terminal patient to decide when to
end life. That right should include the ability to request assistance
from the medical profession to end life quickly and painlessly. 224 The
218. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
The initiative does not provide for non-terminal competent or incompetent patients to
request aid-in-dying. The reason, according to Michael H. White, was a matter of line
drawing due to sensitivity to the current political and public climate. White Interview,
supra note 176.
219. This would mean invalidating section 401 of the California Penal Code which
makes assisting another to commit suicide a criminal offense. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
221. Note, The Legal Aspects of the Right to Die: Before and After the Quinlan
Decision, 65 Ky. L.J. 823, 867-68 (1977); see also notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
222. Riga, supra note 17, at 107.
223. See supra note 20.
224. In a concurring opinion in Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146-48, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 307-308 (see supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text), Justice Compton
eloquently argued:
state should not interfere as long as the rights of others are not af-
fected and there is no threat to the public welfare. 2  A competent
patient who has made such a decision should be immune from state
interference, even though the decision might be considered by others
to be immoral or unwise.
XI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST AID-IN-DYING
There are many arguments against aid-in-dying. One is the rare
possibility of a mistaken terminal diagnosis. A caution is included in
the Initiative's Directive to Physicians.2 " Most patients are aware
that medical science is not perfect and that there is always the possi-
bility of a miracle cure.
Another argument is that if one of the purposes of the Initiative is
to alleviate unnecessary pain and suffering,227 medical technology
now can provide the patient with drugs which eliminate pain. There-
fore, if the patient is in no physical pain, he or she does not need to
end life. However, in some terminal cases drugs may alleviate pain,
but also may leave the patient in a nearly comatose state, which can
hardly be considered "life." It ethically is acceptable to sedate a pa-
tient into unconsciousness to control pain, even if the sedation has-
tens death.2 8 In other words, hastening death by medication is ethi-
cal as long as the intent to cause death is absent. Such so-called
ethical behavior sits on an extremely fine line, and one worth cross-
ing in order to humanely aid a patient in dying.
A third argument is that if aid-in-dying is permitted, physicians
[I] feel compelled to write separately and reflect on what I consider to be
one of the real tragedies of this case, which is that Elizabeth Bouvia has had to
go to such ends to obtain relief from her suffering.
Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she
prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intolerable con-
dition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision. This state
and the medical profession, instead of frustrating her desire, should be at-
tempting to relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die
with ease and dignity. The fact that she is forced to suffer the ordeal of self-
starvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own destinies
so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right should, in my opin-
ion, include the ability to enlist assistance from others, including the medical
profession, in making death as painless and quick as possible.
If there is ever a time when we ought to be able to get the "government off
our backs" it is when we face death - either by choice or otherwise.
225. Comment, A Right to Choose Death, 13 CuMa. L. REv. 117, 133 (1982).
226. See supra note 176, para. 7.
227. Initiative, supra note 15, at § 2525.1.
228. One of the guidelines recommended by the Hastings Center for deciding
when to withhold or withdraw life support. See Terminal Care Experts Stress Patients'
Rights, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
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eventually will be asked to administer lethal injections to patients
recently diagnosed with incurable diseases who cannot fac6 the pain
and suffering that lies ahead. Aid-in-dying should not be available to
the patient who merely anticipates pain and suffering. Therefore, for
example, early AIDS patients could not take advantage of aid-in-
dying after they are first diagnosed, even though it is nearly certain
they are terminal. The focus of an aid-in-dying statute is on patients
who are in such a weakened condition that they must ask for assis-
tance from physicians in order to die.
There is also an argument against allowing surrogates to effectu-
ate an aid-in-dying directive. Some fear that surrogates may coerce
patients to consent to aid-in-dying, or such aid may be fraudulently
given. However, the Initiative includes safeguards. The directive can
be revoked at any time by the declarant.229 Also, the decision of a
surrogate to request a physician to administer aid-in-dying can be
reviewed by a hospital ethics committee to assure the integrity of the
directive.230 These safeguards eliminate the greatest risks of poten-
tial fraud. Patients should have the option to appoint a surrogate to
carry out their aid-in-dying wishes should they become incompetent.
Once a patient becomes incompetent, he or she should not automati-
cally lose the right to affect medical treatment decisions, including
the right to request aid-in-dying.
Another argument is that the six-month limit is arbitrary and doc-
tors may feel uncomfortable diagnosing death that far in advance.3
However, without the six-month limit, or any time limit, the period
during which a patient could request aid-in-dying could be inter-
preted to be broad. It would then be necessary to determine, for in-
stance, how much pain and suffering is needed before a patient's re-
quest for aid is granted or to perhaps define "terminal" for each
medical disease. Under such a broad statute, many physicians would
probably argue that patients are not terminal from the disease itself
but from complications of the disease, for example, from infections
such as pneumonia. Therefore, physicians might not diagnose pa-
tients as terminal until death is imminent, which would in many
cases be less than six months.
229. Initiative, supra note 15, at § 2525.5.
230. Id. at § 2525.10.
231. See supra note 208.
XII. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE INITIATIVE
Unlike the Initiative, this Comment proposes that another focus of
an aid-in-dying statute should be on competent non-terminal patients
who experience pain and/or suffering from incurable diseases. This
focus is also based on an individual's Constitutional right to privacy
and the right to control one's destiny, as discussed throughout this
Comment. It is acknowledged that there are patients suffering some
amount of pain which can be alleviated by drugs. However, suffer-
ing, both mental and physical, may contribute, along with pain, to a
request for aid-in-dying. For example, patients with incurable dis-
eases such as multiple sclerosis,232 Parkinson's Syndrome,23 3 Lou
Gehrig's, 234 or AIDS2'3 and other similar illnesses where the mind is
housed in a body which no longer functions, can suffer greatly as
they lose control of bodily movement and become gradually more
dependent on others for all bodily processes. Such suffering encom-
passes not only a loss of dignity but also in many cases a desire to
end suffering before the disease finally runs its course and death
occurs.
Further, Alzheimer's23 or Huntington's Chorea2 37 patients usually
are not in pain per se during the entire course of the illness, but still
may be suffering greatly from the debilitating effects of the disease
- a useless brain in a body that can function for years. Patients
with such diseases should be able to take advantage of aid-in-dying
if they have executed a directive and if they experience the pain
and/or suffering associated with these diseases.
For all such diseases, the six-month terminal provision should not
be required. Under the Initiative, such patients would have to suffer
for years before being diagnosed as terminal.
232. Multiple sclerosis is "[o]ne of the most common and dreaded" disorders of
the central nervous system, which can lead to total motor disability. The disease pro-
gresses for many years punctuated by relapses and remissions. The end stage is often
characterized by blindness and a "tragic degree of utter helplessness." S. ROBBINS & R.
COTRAN, PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASES 1578-79 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Pathologic
Diseases].
233. "These poor patients present the tragedy of a responsive mind trapped within
an unresponsive body." The disease is characterized by slowness of voluntary movement,
stooped posture, hand tremors, and an expressionless face. Id. at 1585.
234. Also known as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or ALS. Characterized by degen-
eration of the motor system where muscles atrophy. The course is progressive and fatal,
usually within two to six years. Id. at 1587-88.
235. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The body loses ability to fight certain
diseases. UNDERSTANDING AIDS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SEP-
vics, Publication No. HHS-88-8404 (1988).
236. Characterized by progressive atrophy of the entire brain over five to ten years.
The end stage is severe dementia. Death is often associated with dehydration or respira-
tory infection. PATHOLOGIC DISEASES, supra note 232, at 1582.
237. Progressive dementia in which patients manifest delusions, paranoia, neurosis
and abnormal eye movements. The average course of the disease is 15 years. Id. at 1584.
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As further modifications of the Initiative, two clauses should be
eliminated. The Initiative includes a pregnancy clause which states
that the directive is ineffective if the patient is pregnant.238 Because
of its questionable constitutionality, 39 such a clause should not be
included in an aid-in-dying statute, but could be offered on an op-
tional basis.
The Initiative also provides that a directive is effective for seven
years, unless revoked.2 40 An aid-in-dying directive should be effective
until revoked. Since a directive can be revoked at any time, there is
no need for a time limit. A person who has executed a directive
should not be inconvenienced to remember to re-execute the direc-
tive. If he or she has a change of heart, the directive can be revoked.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The Natural Death Act should be amended by the legislature to
incorporate recent case law in order to allow more definitive and
standardized treatment, to clarify vague terms, and to offer patients
more flexibility. Compared with other states' more progressive right-
to-die statutes, California has fallen behind.
The Natural Death Act should be broadened to include coverage
for non-terminal competent and incompetent or permanently uncon-
scious patients, in addition to coverage now provided for competent
terminal patients. The Natural Death Act should also be broadened
to permit guardians to act on behalf of an incompetent patient who
has not executed a directive or a durable power of attorney; to re-
voke the arbitrary fourteen-day waiting period after diagnosis of a
terminal illness so more patients can benefit from the Act; to elimi-
nate the term "imminent" in order to allow a patient to terminate
life support immediately after effecting a directive or immediately
after certification as terminal or permanently unconscious; to restate
the pregnancy clause as an option or only prohibit termination of life
support during the last trimester; and to permit patients to include
individualized instructions within the directive.
The Natural Death Act also should be expanded to incorporate
physician aid-in-dying upon a competent terminal patient's request,
or by a surrogate for an incompetent patient who has previously exe-
cuted a directive. Further, physician aid-in-dying should be available
238. See supra note 176, at para. 3.
239. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
240. Initiative, supra note 15, at § 2525.6(a).
for competent non-terminal patients who experience pain and/or suf-
fer from incurable diseases. The Natural Death Act also should
guarantee that physicians will not be criminally liable for assisting a
patient to die.
The right of a terminally ill, permanently unconscious or non-ter-
minal patient to choose his or her own course of treatment, whether
it be the withholding or withdrawing of life-support equipment or a
request for help in ending life, legally should be upheld without state
interference. In the end, it is the patient who ultimately must decide
whether it is worth hoping for a new dawn.
SHERRI SCHAEFFER
